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Abstract:  The  “use  value”  of  assets  in  the  classical  paradigm  allowed  distinction 
between those held by capitalists and those held by rentiers.  Most small businesses in 
the  United  States  operate  more  akin  to  the  model  of  rentiers  than  capitalists.  
Ironically, long run equilibrium in the Marshallian competitive system between total 
revenue and total cost describes both the small business and the nonprofit sectors.  
Nonprofits, of course, are mission driven, owned publically rather than privately, and 
governed by appointed boards of directors.  It is argued that analogous to nonprofits, 
privately owned small businesses in the United States should become mission driven.    
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1. PSEUDO-CAPITALISM 
 
The U.S. has become the locus of spectacular frauds, both legal and illegal, precipitating the 
international financial crisis of 2008.  The term I use to describe U.S.-style speculative corporate 
capitalism is “pseudo-capitalism.”  Doctrinally, it grows out of a “glitch” in the conventional 
neoclassical paradigm.  Because the rate of profit—otherwise the reward for holding capital—is 
not specified, there may eventually become no practical distinction between asset placements by 
capitalists and asset placements by rentiers.  Thus, the “profit lacuna” contributes to gullibility on 
the part of those who “oversee” what John Kenneth Galbraith called “the conventional wisdom.”   
Policy makers insulate themselves against the reality that otherwise legitimate capitalists may be 
motivated  to  seek  equivalent  rewards  by  operating  as  pseudo-capitalist  rentiers,  instead.    A 
consequence is that society becomes increasingly subjected to fraudulent acts, and also denied 
the extra skill, industry and legitimate risk-taking associated historically with capitalist ventures.   
 
In order to set the conventional pseudo-capitalist wisdom aright, first it becomes necessary to 
address the matter doctrinally.  This includes a thorough, thoughtful searching—particularly by 
the  faculties  of  MBA  and  other  economic-based  professional  programs—in  order  to 
“deconstruct” business strategy-setting, then to refocus upon ethical implications.  Ultimately the 
resolution of the profit  lacuna requires the polity—rather than the “free” market—to set the 
appropriate  rate  of  profit  on  capital.    First,  however,  in  wealthy  societies,  the  polity  must 
determine the economic path from the present, toward the future, and the programs essential to 
that  end.    Capital,  then,  definitionally,  becomes  the  means  to  that  end.    Asset  placements 
consistent with society’s vision of what is wanted for the future become designated as capital, 
worthy of receiving a capitalist’s reward.  On the other hand, asset placements that do not are 
deemed to be rentier-held assets, only.  These may be “neutral” in the sense they merely maintain 
society  in  its  present  course,  rather  than  leading  it  toward  new  accomplishments.    Indeed, 
maintenance may be both desirable and essential, depending upon the situation.   
 
The rentier is similar to the lord of the manor in feudal society, in many respects.  He rented land 
and perhaps loaned finance, and was a force stabilizing and sustaining the status quo against 
rapid change.  This may have either salutatory or non-salutary consequences, depending upon the 
polity’s values for stability, juxtaposed against values favoring dynamic change.  All other things 
considered, rentiers may not be “bad guys” or “good guys,” per se.  Certainly they become bad 
guys, however, to the extent they  fraudulently  seek to obtain the higher reward that society 
decrees for the capitalist. 
 
Tax  and  regulatory  incentives,  primarily,  become  the  vehicles  for  transmitting  the  profit 
differential.  Rentiers under this proposal would qualify only for the Marshallian reward for 
waiting to consume.  Indeed, in the long run the Marshallian reward is just sufficient to motivate 
rentiers to retain their assets in status quo use. 
 
Large  changes,  of  course,  should  be  in  store  for  governance  of  U.S.-based  corporations.  
President Barak Obama’s programmatic initiatives will be observed carefully, publically, with a 
level of interest appropriate to recent, stunning disclosures of corporate malfeasance, particularly 
in the financial services industry.  One implication is that financial services, particularly, may 
become subjected to strategic and exacting oversight.  Financial innovation, for instance, should 5 
 
qualify as capitalist-driven rather than rentier-driven only to the extent it coincides with—and is 
essential to—the attainment of society’s vision.  Therefore, as corporations are rechartered, their 
preferred status as legal “person” should be extended, conditionally, it is argued, according to 
how their proposed missions may articulate with society’s preferred vision.  The implications of 
crafting an explicit social welfare function, of course, are profound.  
 
 
2. NORMAL VS. ECONOMIC PROFIT 
 
In the Marshallian system—the staple of undergraduate instruction in the United States—under 
assumed conditions of perfect competition, ironically, the entrepreneur is actually a rentier, at 
least over the long run.  Any short-term economic profits become bid away as new firms are 
attracted to enter, tapping into the industry’s profit potential.  Ultimately the representative firm 
earns just a normal profit, sufficient for it to remain because its asset placements, if liquefied, 
could do no better elsewhere.  Definitionally, this is consistent with the rate of return on asset 
placements by rentiers.   
 
In the long-run competitive situation, then, total revenue is equal to total cost, where normal 
profit  (not  economic  profit)  is  computed  as  a  necessary  cost  of  doing business.    Somewhat 
ironically, these are the same technical conditions under which organizations operate within the 
nonprofit sector.  That is, a nonprofit entity is defined as one in which total revenue is equal to 
total  cost  over  the  long  run,  with  normal  costs  also  including  1)  “Rainy  day”  reserves,  2) 
Resources for prudent expansion, and 3) Replacement of worn assets.   
 
Fundamental  differences  between  private  (nonprofit)  firms  and  “third  sector”  nonprofit 
organizations, of course, pertain to mission and to organizational governance.  For the typical 
U.S. firm, mission is currently that of making a profit, only.  Governance is entirely by the firm’s 
private owners who accrue “profit” or sustain loss.  For nonprofits, on the other hand, mission is 
set according to some aspect of service to the common good and governance is by appointed 
boards of directors who hire and retain executive directors.  Also, in the event of demise, in the 
private sector the owners retain any financial residual.  In the nonprofit situation, however, any 
residual must be passed to another nonprofit.  Private individuals and firms never share in a 
nonprofit’s  surplus  or  residual  distributions,  except  of  course  in  cases  where  fraud  may  be 
present.     
 
Not only are capital assets heterogeneous, but output also is heterogeneous, it is argued.  Not 
every dollar of GDP makes an equal contribution to social welfare.  Indeed, the widespread 
prevalence of business malfeasance now requires society’s social welfare function to be made 
explicit, as earlier claimed.  Recently the United States is struggling with “bailouts,” including 
various  scenarios  for  bailing  out  the  domestic  automobile  industry.    In  such  a  “pick  the 
survivors” environment, these struggling corporations may be publically sustained only within 
the context of new public demands for higher standards of performance and accountability.   
 
The  previous  short-term  winning  strategy  by  Detroit  automakers  had  as  its  centerpiece  the 
production of vast quantities of fuel inefficient and environmentally degrading, large sport utility 
vehicles (SUV’s).  These are now becoming somewhat verboten, publically, particularly in the 6 
 
wake of extraordinarily high petroleum prices through the third quarter of 2008.  One may ask, 
then, is one more dollar’s worth of SUV output equivalent to one more dollar’s worth of output 
that is both fuel-efficient and environmentally less damaging?  The answer, I believe, in light of 
America’s quickly changing values on this subject, is that GDP—created in the auto industry or 
elsewhere—is unlikely to be considered as homogeneous, going forward.   
 
 
3. USE VALUE OF ASSETS 
 
The concealing of capital “use value” as a characteristic of the prevailing neoclassical paradigm 
had enormous implications for inefficacious economic policy outcomes.  Within the classical 
system, of course, the use-value of an asset could be traced.  A horse in the field, pulling a plow, 
for  instance,  would  qualify  as  a  productive  capital  placement.    If  the  horse  should  be 
permanently removed from the field and tethered by the farmer’s door for the pleasure of his 
children, however, then “capital” would have been removed from productive use.  That is, its 
use-value would have shifted from a capitalist controlled asset to one controlled by an individual 
qua rentier. 
 
Again, capital must now be determined on the basis of its use value, juxtaposed against a social 
welfare function.  Indeed, no aspect of the Obama presidency is more important that the crafting 
of a politically viable vision for the future, and a plan for allocating shared sacrifice to bring that 
vision into reality.   
 
Emergent “mission-driven capitalism” will now require every unit of government, particularly at 
state and local levels in the United States, to come forward with these sorts of plans.  To the 
extent the inevitable legal challenges are survived, then these plans may become the basis for re-
chartering private firms across the broad fabric of American society.  Each firm, it is proposed, 
should operate with a “mission,” above and beyond “making a profit.”  Each firm should be 
challenged to demonstrate how its activities and outputs are consistent with the public vision to 
which its activities pertain. 
 
To summarize, then, society’s vision at each level and unit of government is essential to crafting 
a social welfare function, which becomes instrumental in the determination of the use value of 
various assets.  Businesses should be rechartered, it is argued, around  mission.  Most small 
businesses in the United States operate under conditions that are essentially nonprofit, within the 
Marshallian framework.  Arguably these businesses could be made to  be considerably more 
mission-driven.  They would operate more like nonprofits, but would be retained under private 
ownership.  Since all units of (GDP) output are not equal with regard to mission, the contribution 
of a particular business to the common good would be determined not solely on the basis of its 
ability to survive, but principally on its ability to create output and to marshal inputs consistent 
with community values.   
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4. RENTIER-OPERATED SMALL BUSINESSES 
 
The focus of this paper is small businesses rather than large corporations. Characteristically, 
small  businesses  might  include  light  manufacturing  or  professional  services,  such  as  law, 
accounting or medicine, for instance.  Also included are a myriad of firms that operate within the 
economic  pattern  characterized  by  the  textbook  model  of  monopolistic  competition.    For 
purposes of illustration here, the reader is asked to consider, stereotypically, fast food restaurants 
and convenience stores including petrol stations.  These are low wage businesses and account for 
the vast majority of jobs created by small U.S. firms.   
 
The social welfare implications of small business are convoluted, at best.  Often these firms are 
significant “engines” of job creation.  However, they also pay sub-marginal wages with limited 
or no medical benefits.  In the best of times, individuals who hold these jobs are likely to exist at 
the margins of society.  The sector should now be reconceptualized, it is argued, somewhat away 
from portraying most of these businesses as “dynamic engines of growth,” and more realistically, 
toward  conceptualizing  them  as  mere  rentier  extensions  of  the  status  quo.    As  such,  their 
attributes  may  comprise  some  mix,  ranging  from  socially  beneficent  to  socially  destructive.  
Examples of “socially destructive,” for instance, could include businesses that may enslave or 
exploit, as determined by community standards.   
 
The small business community characteristically opposes minimum wage laws.  Typically state 
legislators are presented with a trade off by the small business lobby, arguing that a higher 
minimum  wage  can  be  gained  only  if  jobs  are  sacrificed.    Raising  the  minimum,  for  some 
existing quantity of employed workers, will raise marginal resource cost (MRC) above marginal 
revenue product (MRP), according to the neoclassical textbook demonstration in which input and 
output markets are assumed to be competitive.  Consequently, as the MRC of employing some 
fixed quantity of workers rises due to legislatively increased wage minimums, employment and 
output  will  fall.    Not  only  does  this  hurt workers,  at  the margin,  and  employers,  but  it  has 
significant social welfare cost implications as well, owners will characteristically argue.  Indeed, 
they may argue they are hurt twice-over by government action to shore up the minimum wage.  
First, higher MRC translates into higher prices, a lower quantity of output sold, and consequently 
lower income and lower profit.  Second, the lobbying community may also argue that as citizens, 
the small business community is “forced” to pay higher taxes to support higher levels of state-
induced social welfare, this in lieu of their preferred strategy for the state to remove minimum 
wage and other regulations, leaving these businesses free to hire at “market-competitive” wages.  
Low-wage  workers  who  choose  to  do  so,  it  may  be  contended,  may  improve  their  earning 
potential by increasing their human capital through education and training programs undertaken 
at their initiative.  
 
Small  businesses  may  petition  state  governments,  particularly  during  economic  downturns, 
arguing the best way to create jobs and thus to reduce unemployment is to reduce operating costs 
of small businesses through reductions in business taxes and regulations.  This, of course, is in 
addition to auguring against the minimum minimum wage, or against minimum wage increases, 
even in the face of an increasing cost of living faced by their workers.  
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When faced with such petitions from lobbyists for small businesses, then, responses from state 
legislators, particularly, may begin to take on this “flavor.”  First, the small business community 
would be reminded they are not capitalists, per se, but rentiers, engaged mainly in maintaining 
the status quo.  As such, it is incumbent upon them to demonstrate at the time of rechartering, 
how  the  mission  of  a  specific  business  may  articulate  with  community  standards,  otherwise 
known by economists as the social welfare function.  For those businesses that do pursue a 
mission reasonably consistent with community standards, the state may well argue, legitimately 
so,  that  medical  insurance  and  retirement  benefits  are  best  offered  through  the  employment 
relationship, rather than through state-funded programs such as Medicaid, for instance.  These 
businesses break even—that is, earn normal rather than economic profit.  Typically they do not 
face “off-shore” competition, and therefore compete only with one another.  The state may argue 
authentically that improving the underlying level of wages and benefits for their workers will not 
necessarily preclude the viability of the businesses, since each business will bear increased wage 
and  benefit costs  proportionate  to  existing payroll  levels.   Some  businesses  operating at the 
margin with regard to their competitors, may suffer collapse, however.     
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